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Abstract. In [1], systems of weakening of intuitionistic negation logic called Zn
and CZn were developed in the spirit of da Costa’s approach(c.f. [2]) by preserv-
ing, differently from da Costa, its fundamental properties: antitonicity, inversion
and additivity for distributive lattices. However, according to [3], those systems
turned out to be not paraconsistent but extensions of intuitionistic logic. Taking
into account of this result, we shall here make some observations on the modified
systems of Zn and CZn, that are paraconsistent as well.
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1 Introduction
The big challenge for paraconsistent logics is to avoid allowing contradictory theories
to explode and derive anything else and still to reserve a respectable logic, that is, a
logic capable of drawing reasonable conclusions from contradictory theories.
There are different approaches to paraconsistent logics: The first is the non construc-
tive approach, based on abstract logic (as LFI [4]), where logic connectives and their
particular semantics are not considered. The second is the constructive approach and is
divided in two parts: axiomatic proof theoretic (cases of da Costa [2] and [5,6,7]), and
many-valued (case [8]) model theoretic based on truth-functional valuations (that is,
it satisfies the truth-compositionality principle). The best case is when we obtain both
proof and model theoretic definition which are mutually sound and complete.
One of the main founders with Stanislav Jaskowski [9], da Costa, built his propositional
paraconsistent system Cω in [2] by weakening the logic negation operator ¬, in order
to avoid the explosive inconsistency [4,10] of the classic propositional logic, where the
ex falso quodlibet proof rule A, ¬A
B
is valid. In fact, in order to avoid this classic logic
rule, he changed the semantics for the negation operator, so that:
– NdC1: in these calculi the principle of non-contradiction, in the form ¬(A ∧ ¬A),
should not be a generally valid schema, but if it does hold for formula A, it is a
well-behaved formula, and is denoted by A◦;
– NdC2: from two contradictory formulae,A and ¬A, it would not in general be pos-
sible to deduce an arbitrary formula B. That is it does not hold the falso quodlibet
proof rule A, ¬A
B
;
– NdC3: it should be simple to extend these calculi to corresponding predicate calculi
(with or without equality);
– NdC4: they should contain most parts of the schemata and rules of classical propo-
sitional calculus which do not infere with the first conditions
In fact Da Costa’s paraconsistent propositional logic is made up of the unique Modus
Ponens inferential rule (MP), A,A ⇒ B ⊢ B, and two axiom subsets. But before
stating them we need the following definition as it is done in da Costa’s systems(c.f. [2,
p.500]), which uses three binary connectives, ∧ for conjunction, ∨ for disjunction and
⇒ for implication:
Definition 1. Let A be a formula and 1 ≤ n < ω. Then, we define A◦, An, A(n) as
follows:
A◦ =def ¬(A ∧ ¬A), An =def A
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
◦◦· · ·◦
, and A(n) =def A1 ∧A2 ∧ · · · ∧ An.
The first one is for the positive propositional logic (without negation), composed by the
following eight axioms, borrowed from the classic propositional logic of the Kleene L4
system, and also from the more general propositional intuitionistic system (these two
systems differ only regarding axioms with the negation operator),
(IPC+) POSITIVE LOGIC AXIOMS:
(1) A⇒ (B ⇒ A)
(2) (A⇒ B)⇒ ((A⇒ (B ⇒ C))⇒ (A⇒ C))
(3) A⇒ (B ⇒ (A ∧B))
(4) (A ∧B)⇒ A
(5) (A ∧B)⇒ B
(6) A⇒ (A ∨B)
(7) B ⇒ (A ∨B)
(8) (A⇒ C)⇒ ((B ⇒ C)⇒ ((A ∨B)⇒ C))
and change the original axioms for negation of the classic propositional logic, by defin-
ing semantics of negation by the following subset of axioms:
(NLA) LOGIC AXIOMS FOR NEGATION:
(9) A ∨ ¬A
(10) ¬¬A⇒ A
(11) B(n) ⇒ ((A⇒ B)⇒ ((A⇒ ¬B)⇒ ¬A)) (Reductio relativization axiom)
(12) (A(n) ∧B(n))⇒ ((A ∧B)(n) ∧ (A ∨B)(n) ∧ (A⇒ B)(n))

It is easy to see that the axiom (11) relativizes the classic reductio axiom (A ⇒ B) ⇒
((A ⇒ ¬B) ⇒ ¬A) (which is equivalent to the contraposition axiom (A ⇒ ¬B) ⇒
(B ⇒ ¬A) and the trivialization axiom¬(A⇒ A)⇒ B), only for propositionsB such
that B(n) is valid, and in this way avoids the validity of the classic ex falso quodlibet
proof rule. It provides a qualified form of reductio, helping to prevent general validity of
B(n) in the paraconsistent logic Cn. The axiom (12) regulates only the propagation of
n-consistency. It is easy to verify that n-consistency also propagates through negation,
that is, A(n) ⇒ (¬A)(n) is provable in Cn. So that for any fixed n (from 0 to ω) we
obtain a particular da Costa paraconsistent logic Cn.
One may regard Cω as a kind of syntactic limit [11] of the calculi in the hierarchy.
Each Cn is strictly weaker than any of its predecessors, i.e., denoting by Th(S) the set
of theorems of calculus S, we have:
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Th(CPL) ⊃ Th(C1) ⊃ ... ⊃ Th(Cn) ⊃ ... ⊃ Th(Cω).
Thus we are fundamentally interested in the C1 system which is a paraconsistent logic
closer to the CPL (Classic propositional logic), that is, C1 is the paraconsistent logic of
da Costa’s hierarchy obtained by minimal change of CPL.
It is well known that the classic propositional logic based on the classic 2-valued com-
plete distributive lattice (2,≤) with the set 2 = {0, 1} of truth values, has a truth-
compositional model theoretic semantics. For this da Costa calculi is not given any
truth-compositional model theoretic semantics instead.
The non-truth-functional bivaluations (mappings from the set of well-formed formu-
lae of Cn into the set 2) used in [12,13] induce the decision procedure for Cn known
as quasi-matrices instead. In this method, a negated formulae within truth-tables must
branch: if A takes the value 0 then ¬A takes the value 1 (as usual), but if A takes the
value 1 then ¬A can take either the value 0 or the value 1; both possibilities must be
considered, as well as the other axioms governing the bivaluations.
Consequently, the da Costa system still needs a kind of (relative) compositional model-
theoretic semantics. Based on these observations, in [1] are explained some weak prop-
erties of Da Costa weakening for a negation operator, and was shown that it is not
antitonic, differently from the negations in the classic and intuitionistic propositional
logics (that have the truth-compositional model theoretic semantics). The axioms for
negation in CPL are as follows:
(NCLA) CLASSIC AXIOMS FOR NEGATION:
(9) A ∨ ¬A
(10c) (A⇒ B)⇒ ((A⇒ ¬B)⇒ ¬A)
(11c) A⇒ (¬A⇒ B)
(12c) 0⇒ A, A⇒ 1
while for the intuitionistic logic we eliminate the axiom (9).
The negation in the classic and intuitionistic logics are not paraconsistent (see for exam-
ple Proposition 30, pp 118, in [8]), so that Majkic´’s idea in [1] was to make a weakening
of the intuitionistic negation by considering only its general antitonic property: in fact
the formula (A ⇒ B) ⇒ (¬B ⇒ ¬A) is a thesis in both classic and intuitionistic
logics. Consequently, his idea was to make da Costa weakening of the intuitionistic
negation [1], that is, to define the system Zn for each n by adding the following axioms
to the system IPC+:
(11) B(n) ⇒ ((A⇒ B)⇒ ((A⇒ ¬B)⇒ ¬A))
(12) (A(n) ∧B(n))⇒ ((A ∧B)(n) ∧ (A ∨B)(n) ∧ (A⇒ B)(n))
(9b) (A⇒ B)⇒ (¬B ⇒ ¬A)
(10b) 1⇒ ¬0, ¬1⇒ 0
(11b) A⇒ 1, 0⇒ A
(12b) (¬A ∧ ¬B)⇒ ¬(A ∨B)
Finally, the hierarchy CZn is obtained by adding the following axiom:
(13b) ¬(A ∧B)⇒ (¬A ∨ ¬B)
The result provided in [3] is that in the above formulation of the system Zn, axioms
(11), (12) and (12b) are redundant in the sense that those formulas can be derived
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from the other axioms (9b), (10b) and (11b) in addition to IPC+. Obviously, the for-
mulation of CZn is given by adding the axiom (13b). As a result, systems Zn and
CZn do not form a hierarchy but are single systems. It is also proved that formulas
‘(A ⇒ (A ∧ ¬A)) ⇒ ¬A’ and ‘A ⇒ (¬A ⇒ B)’ can be proved in Zn which shows
that Zn and CZn are extensions of intuitionistic propositional calculus and therefore not
paraconsistent.
In fact, the introduction of the axiom ¬1 ⇒ 0 in the system Zn is not necessary for
the all obtained results in [1]: this formula was responsible for the fact that Zn is not
paraconsistent.
In what follows we will present the properties of this modified system, by eliminating
this formulae from the system Zn.
2 Paraconsistent weakening of negation
In what follows we consider modified systems of Zn and CZn which can be obtained
by eliminating the formula ‘¬1 ⇒ 0’ of axiom (10b) from the systems Zn and CZn.
Notice that this axiom is not necessary in order to have additive modal negation op-
erator that can be modeled by Birkhoff’s polarity as required in [1]. We shall refer to
these systems as mZn and mCZn respectively and also refer to the modified axiom as
(10b)’.
Thus, all results obtained in [1] are preserved for this logic: what we need is only to
eliminate the sequent ¬1 ⊢ 0 from (5a) in Definition 7 (Gentzen-like system) in [1] as
well.
Consequently, these modified systemsmZn andmCZn have the Kripke possible world
semantics for these two paraconsistent logics (defined by Definition 6 in [1]), and based
on it, the many-valued semantics based on functional hereditary distributive lattice of al-
gebraic truth-values. Finally, this many-valued (and Kripke) semantics, based on model-
theoretic entailment, is adequate, that is, sound and complete w.r.t. the proof-theoretic
da Costa axiomatic systems of these two paraconsistent logics mZn and mCZn.
We now prove some another results on mZn and mCZn:
Proposition 1 Following formulas are derivable in mZn (we denote by A ≡ B the
formulae (A⇒ B) ∧ (B ⇒ A)):
((A⇒ B) ∧ (A⇒ C))⇒ (A⇒ (B ∧ C)) (T0)
(A⇒ (B ⇒ C))⇒ (B ⇒ (A⇒ C)) (T1)
(A⇒ B)⇒ ((B ⇒ C)⇒ (A⇒ C)) (T2)
(A⇒ (B ⇒ C)) ≡ ((A ∧B)⇒ C) (T3)
This is obvious since mZn contains IPC+.
Theorem 1 Systems mZn and mCZn are paraconsistent.
Proof: Just interpret the negation as a function always giving truth value 1 whereas other
connectives interpreted in a standard way done in two valued for classical propositional
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calculus.

It should be noted that even though we have the above theorem, the following formula
(A ∧ ¬A)⇒ ¬B is still derivable, as we can show by the following lemma:
Lemma 1. The following formulae are derivable in mZn:
(A ∧ ¬A)⇒ ¬B NEFQ
¬¬(A ∧B)⇒ (¬¬A ∧ ¬¬B) (♥)
¬((A ∗B)n)⇒ (¬(An) ∨ ¬(Bn)) (♣)
where ∗ ∈ {⇒,∧,∨}.
Proof: Let us derive NEFQ:
1 A⇒ (B ⇒ A) [(1)]
2 (B ⇒ A)⇒ (¬A⇒ ¬B) [(9b)]
3 A⇒ (¬A⇒ ¬B) [1, 2, (T2)]
4 (A ∧ ¬A)⇒ ¬B [3, (T3), (MP)]
Notice that (NEFQ) is not desirable for some paraconsistent
Let us derive♥ now. We will only prove the following, since the case in which ¬¬A is
replaced by ¬¬B can be proved analogously:
¬¬(A ∧B)⇒ ¬¬A
This can be proved easily by making use of axioms (3) and (9b).
Let us derive♣ now. The proof runs as follows:
1 ¬((A ∗B)n) ≡ ¬¬((A ∗B)n−1 ∧ ¬(A ∗B)n−1) [Definition of An]
2 ¬¬((A ∗B)n−1 ∧¬(A ∗B)n−1)⇒ (¬¬(A ∗B)n−1 ∧¬¬¬(A ∗B)n−1) [(♥)]
3 (¬¬(A ∗B)n−1 ∧ ¬¬¬(A ∗B)n−1)⇒ ¬(An) [(NEFQ)]
4 ¬(An)⇒ (¬(An) ∨ ¬(Bn)) [(6)]
5 ¬((A ∗B)n)⇒ (¬(An) ∨ ¬(Bn)) [1, 2, 3, 4, (T2), (MP)]
This completes the proof.

Let us show now that the axioms (11) and (12) are redundant in the System mZn.
Theorem 2 The axioms (11) and (12) are redundant in mZn in the sense that they can
be proved by another axioms.
Proof: The redundance of the axiom (11) can be proved as follows:
1 (A⇒ (B ∧ ¬B)) ⇒ (¬(B ∧ ¬B)⇒ ¬A) [(9b)]
2 ¬(B ∧ ¬B)⇒ ((A⇒ (B ∧ ¬B))⇒ ¬A) [1, (T1), (MP)]
3 B(n) ⇒ B1 [Definition of B(n)]
4 B(n) ⇒ ¬(B ∧ ¬B) [Definition of B1]
5 B(n) ⇒ ((A⇒ (B ∧ ¬B))⇒ ¬A) [2, 4, (T2), (MP)]
Let us prove the redundance of the axiom (12). It would be sufficient to prove the
following in order to prove the desired result:
(A(n) ∧B(n))⇒ (A ∗B)n (♦)
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Indeed, if we have (♦) at hand then we can prove
(A(n) ∧B(n))⇒ (A ∗B)m
for any 1 ≤ m ≤ n and combining all these cases, we obtain
(A(n) ∧B(n))⇒ (A ∗B)(n)
which is axiom (12). So, we now prove (♦) which runs as follows:
1 (A(n)∧B(n))⇒ (((A∗B)n−1∧¬(A∗B)n−1)⇒ (¬(An−1)∨¬(Bn−1)) [(♣)]
2 (A(n) ∧ B(n)) ⇒ (((A ∗ B)n−1 ∧ ¬(A ∗ B)n−1) ⇒ ((An−1 ∧ ¬(An−1)) ∨
(Bn−1 ∧ ¬(Bn−1))))
[1, Definition1]
3 (((A∗B)n−1∧¬(A∗B)n−1)⇒ ((An−1∧¬(An−1))∨(Bn−1∧¬(Bn−1))))⇒
(¬((An−1 ∧ ¬(An−1)) ∨ (Bn−1 ∧ ¬(Bn−1))) ⇒ ¬((A ∗ B)n−1 ∧ ¬(A ∗ B)n−1))
[(9b)]
4 (A(n) ∧ B(n)) ⇒ (¬((An−1 ∧ ¬(An−1)) ∨ (Bn−1 ∧ ¬(Bn−1))) ⇒ ¬((A ∗
B)n−1 ∧ ¬(A ∗B)n−1))
[2, 3, (T2), (MP)]
5 (¬(An−1 ∧ ¬(An−1)) ∧ ¬(Bn−1 ∧ ¬(Bn−1))) ⇒ ¬((An−1 ∧ ¬(An−1)) ∨
(Bn−1 ∧ ¬(Bn−1))) [(12b)]
6 (A(n) ∧B(n))⇒ ((An ∧Bn)⇒ (A ∗B)n) [4, (T1), 5, (T2), Definition1, (MP)]
7 (A(n) ∧B(n))⇒ (An ∧Bn) [Definition1]
8 (A(n) ∧B(n))⇒ (A ∗B)n [6, 7, (2), (MP)]
This completes the proof.

After all, we now know that systems mZn do not form a hierarchy but are equivalent to
a single system which consists of IPC+ together with axioms (9b), (10b)’, (11b), (12b)
and mCZn can be formulated by adding (13b) to these formulas. Note also that we
didn’t make any use of axioms (10b)’ and (11b) in proving Theorem 2.
Although it is not directly connected to the story of mZn and mCZn, it should be
noted that propagation axiom for negation, i.e. the following formula can be derived in
an analogous manner:
A(n) ⇒ (¬A)(n)
Therefore, propagation axioms can be fully proved in systems mZn and mCZn.
3 Semantics of negation based on Bikhoff’s polarity
In [1] (Proposition 3) was demonstrated that the positive fragment of these two systems
corresponds to the distributive lattice (X,≤) (positive fragment of the Heyting alge-
bra), where the logic implication corresponds to the relative pseudocomplement, 0, 1
are bottom and top elements in X respectively.
Now we may introduce a hierarchy of negation operators [8] for many-valued logics
based on complete lattices of truth values (X,≤), w.r.t their homomorphic properties:
the negation with the lowest requirements (antitonic) denominated ”general” negation
can be defined in any complete lattice (see example in [1]):
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Definition 2. HIERARCHY OF NEGATION OPERATORS: Let (X,≤,∧,∨) be a com-
plete lattice. Then we define the following hierarchy of negation operators on it:
1. A general negation is a monotone mapping between posets (≤OP is inverse of≤),
¬ : (X,≤)→ (X,≤)OP , such that {1} ⊆ {y = ¬x | x ∈ X}.
2. A split negation is a general negation extended into join-semilattice homomor-
phism,
¬ : (X,≤,∨, 0) → (X,≤,∨, 0)OP , with (X,≤,∨, 0)OP = (X,≤OP ,∨OP , 0OP ),
∨OP = ∧, 0OP = 1.
3. A constructive negation is a general negation extended into full lattice homo-
morphism, ¬ : (X,≤,∧,∨)→ (X,≤,∧,∨)OP ,
with (X,≤,∧,∨)OP = (X,≤OP ,∧OP ,∨OP ), and ∧OP = ∨.
4. A De Morgan negation is a constructive negation when the lattice homomorphism
is an involution (¬¬x = x).
The names given to these different kinds of negations follow from the fact that a split
negation introduces the second right adjoint negation, that a constructive negation satis-
fies the constructive requirement (as in Heyting algebras) ¬¬x ≥ x, while De Morgan
negation satisfies well known De Morgan laws:
Lemma 2. NEGATION PROPERTIES): Let (X,≤) be a complete lattice. Then the
following properties for negation operators hold: for any x, y ∈ X ,
1. for general negation: ¬(x ∨ y) ≤ ¬x ∧ ¬y, ¬(x ∧ y) ≥ ¬x ∨ ¬y,
with ¬0 = 1 .
2. for split negation: ¬(x ∨ y) = ¬x ∧ ¬y, ¬(x ∧ y) ≥ ¬x ∨ ¬y. It is an additive
modal operator with right adjoint (multiplicative) negation ∼: (X,≤)OP → (X,≤),
and Galois connection ¬x ≤OP y iff x ≤∼ y, such that x ≤∼ ¬x and x ≤ ¬ ∼ x.
3. for constructive negation: ¬(x ∨ y) = ¬x ∧ ¬y, ¬(x ∧ y) = ¬x ∨ ¬y. It is a
selfadjoint operator, ¬ =∼, with x ≤ ¬¬x satisfying proto De Morgan inequalities
¬(¬x ∨ ¬y) ≥ x ∧ y and ¬(¬x ∧ ¬y) ≥ x ∨ y.
4. for De Morgan negation (¬¬x = x): it satisfies also De Morgan laws ¬(¬x∨¬y) =
x ∧ y and ¬(¬x ∧ ¬y) = x ∨ y, and is contrapositive, i.e., x ≤ y iff ¬x ≥ ¬y.
Proof can be found in [8].
Remark: We can see (as demonstrated in [1] that the system mZn without axiom (12b)
corresponds to a particular case of general negation, that the whole system mZn corre-
sponds to a particular case of split negation, while the system mCZn corresponds to a
particular case of constructive negation.
The Galois connections can be obtained from any binary relation based on a set W [14]
(Birkhoff polarity) in a canonical way:
If (W ,R) is a set with a particular relation based on a set W , R ⊆ W × W , with
mappings λ : P(W) → P(W)OP , ̺ : P(W)OP → P(W), such that for subsets
U, V ∈ P(W),
λU = {w ∈ W | ∀u ∈ U.((u,w) ∈ R)} , ρV = {w ∈ W | ∀v ∈ V.((w, v) ∈ R)},
where (P(W),⊆) is the powerset poset complete distributive lattice with bottom ele-
ment empty set ∅ and top element W , and P(W)OP its dual (with ⊆OP inverse of ⊆),
then we have the induced Galois connection λ ⊣ ρ, i.e., λU ⊆OP V iff U ⊆ ρV .
It is easy to verify that λ and ρ are two antitonic set-based operators which invert empty
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set ∅ into W , thus can be used as set-based negation operators. The negation as modal
operator has a long history [15].
We denote by R the class of such binary incompatibility relationsR ⊆ W×W which
are also hereditary, that is
if (u,w) ∈ R and (u,w)  (u′, w′) then (u′, w′) ∈ R,
where (u,w)  (u′, w′) iff u ≤ u′ and w ≤ w′.
Analogously to demonstration given in [1], it is easy to see that, for any given hered-
itary incompatibility relation R, the additive algebraic operator λ can be used as the
split negation for mZn (or constructive negation, when λ is selfadjoint, i.e., λ = ρ, for
mCZn).
Corollary 1 Each split negation (modal negation), based on the hereditary incompat-
ible relation of Birkhoff polarity, satisfies the Da Costa weakening axioms (11) and
(12).
Proof: for the Birkhoff polarity we have that for any U, V ⊆ W holds the following
additivity property,
λ(U
⋃
V ) = λU
⋃OP
λV = λU
⋂
λV , with λ∅ = ∅OP =W .
It is well known that Heyting algebra operators ar closed for hereditary subsets, so that
λ applied to a hereditary subset U has to result in a hereditary subset λ(U) as well, and
the Lemma 2 in [1] demonstrates that it is satisfied if the relation R is hereditary.
It is enough now to prove that in mZn the following formulae are valid (the logic
negation operator ¬ corresponds to the algebraic operator λ):
¬(A ∨B) ≡ (¬A ∧ ¬B), and ¬0 ≡ 1.
Indeed, we can derive this as follows: Indeed, we can derive this as follows:
1 (1⇒ ¬0)⇒ ((¬0⇒ 1)⇒ ((0⇒ ¬1) ∧ (¬1⇒ 0))) [(3)]
2 (¬0⇒ 1)⇒ ((0⇒ ¬1) ∧ (¬1⇒ 0)) [1, (10b),(MP)]
3 (0⇒ ¬1) ∧ (¬1⇒ 0) [2, (11b), (MP)]
4 ¬0 ≡ 1 [3, by def. of ≡],
and,
1 (A⇒ (A ∨B))⇒ (¬(A ∨B)⇒ ¬A) [(9b)]
2 (B ⇒ (A ∨B))⇒ (¬(A ∨B)⇒ ¬B) [(9b)]
3 ¬(A ∨B)⇒ ¬A [1,(6),(MP)]
4 ¬(A ∨B)⇒ ¬B [2,(7),(MP)]
5 (¬(A ∨B)⇒ ¬A) ∧ (¬(A ∨B)⇒ ¬B) [3,4, (3),(MP)]
6 ((¬(A ∨B)⇒ ¬A) ∧ (¬(A ∨B)⇒ ¬B))⇒ (¬(A ∨B)⇒ (¬A ∧ ¬B)) [
(T0)]
7 ¬(A ∨B)⇒ (¬A ∧ ¬B) [5, 6, (MP)]
8 ¬(A ∨B) ≡ (¬A ∧ ¬B) [7, (12b), by def. of ≡]
This completes the proof.

This property holds for the constructive negation as well, thus for the systems mCZn.
Thus, for these two paraconsistent systems we can define the Kripke semantics in the
similar way as for the intuitionistic logic.
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4 Conclusion
In this paper we have slightly modified a weakening of negation originally presented in
the system Zn [1] in order to obtain a paraconsistent logic, by eliminating the axiom
¬1⇒ 0. This modified system mZn has a split negation.
Moreover if we preserve also the multiplicative property for this weak split negation we
obtain the modified system mCZn with a constructive paraconsistent negation which
satisfies also the contraposition law for negation.
Both systems have the negation that is different from the (nonparaconsistent) intu-
itionistic negation (its algebraic counterpart is different from the pseudocomplement
of Heyting algebras). In both of them the the formula NEFQ is still derivable, but it
does not hold the falso quodlibet proof rule. Thus, they satisfy all da Costa conditions
(from NdC1 to NdC4).
The Kripke-style semantics for these two paraconsistent negations are defined as modal
negations: they are a conservative extension of the positive fragment of Kripke seman-
tics for intuitionistic propositional logic [1], where only the satisfaction for negation
operator is changed by adopting an incompatibility accessibility relation for this modal
operator which comes from Birkhoff polarity theory based on a Galois connection for
negation operator.
If we denote by Z−n the system obtained from mZn by eliminating the axiom (12b)
(thus with the general negation in Definition 2, that is only antitonic), then the da Costa
axiom (12) can not be derived from the another axioms (but the axiom (11) is still deriv-
able from the antitonic property of the negation). But in such a case, when we really
need the da Costa axiom (12), we are not able to define a Kripke-style semantics for this
negation operator, based on the Birkhoff polarity. Consequently, this case needs more
future investigations.
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